



RF-Parrot: Wireless Eavesdropping on Wired Audio

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
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Introduction

Vibration Source



Wireless Sensors



Attacker




Wired Audio



Wireless Sensors




Video



mmWave



LiDAR



RFID

Attacker




Vibration Source

Wireless Sensors

Attacker

Wireless sensors can only recover audio from vibration of physical surface, not applicable to wired audio transmitted in the cable



Video



mmWave



LiDAR



RFID



A possible solution: Radio-frequency Retroreflector Attack (RFRA)

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY



SURLYSPAWN

ANT Product Data

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Data RF retro-reflector. Provides return modulated with target data (keyboard, low data rate digital device) when illuminated with radar.

07 Apr 2009

(U) Capabilities
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) SURLYSPAWN has the capability to gather keystrokes without requiring any software running on the targeted system. It also only requires that the targeted system be touched once. The retro-reflector is compatible with both USB and PS/2 keyboards. The simplicity of the design allows the form factor to be tailored for specific operational requirements. Future capabilities will include laptop keyboards.



1 32NDS
4 8 12 16 20

RFRA was disclosed in ANT Catalog.



NSA Playset:
RF Retroreflectors

Michael Ossmann
Great Scott Gadgets
DEF CON 22
2014



Michael Ossmann reproduces RFRA at DEF CON'22

Related works about RFRA:


Existing RFRAs are only applicable to digital signals (e.g., PS/2, USB, VGA signals).

Question: Can we wirelessly eavesdrop on the wired analog audio with RFRA?

Contributions:

- We propose the first analog RFRA system, **RF-Parrot**, for eavesdropping on the wire-transmitted analog audio signal remotely via a new design of the retroreflector made from the D-MOSFET.
- We demonstrate that RF-Parrot can intercept analog audio signals at a distance of 1 m through the wall.
- We evaluate RF-Parrot using over 65,000 speech commands from thousands of people in various environments.

Digital RFRA:



The signal model of RFRA


- Enhancement mode MOSFET (E-MOSFET) is the retroreflector.
- When the digital voltage signal $V_{gs}(t)$ varies, the E-MOSFET switches between reflective and non-reflective states, **amplitude-modulating the reflective waves.**

Why digital RFRA does not work for analog audio?

- The E-MOSFET can only be activated by positive voltage signal.




The E-MOSFET's
transfer curve:




Positive cut-off
voltage




The Depletion mode
MOSFET's (D-MOSFET)
transfer curve:



Negative cut-off
voltage



The D-MOSFET's transfer curve



Simulated & collected RF signal

The impact of D-MOSFET's transfer curve on received RF signal $y(t)$:


$$y(t) = \begin{cases} \alpha \cdot V_{gs} + \beta & V_{gs} \geq 0 \\ -e^{\gamma \cdot V_{gs}} \cdot V_{gs} & V_c \leq V_{gs} < 0 \\ 0 & V_{gs} < V_c \end{cases} \begin{matrix} \longrightarrow \text{(near) Linear.} \\ \\ \longrightarrow \end{matrix}$$

The negative part kept,
but distorted non-linearly.


The comparison between MCD values of E-MOSFET and D-MOSFET:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
D-MOS	16.9	17.0	16.8	17.7	17.0	17.4	17.7	18.4	16.2	18.5
E-MOS	20.6	23.4	23.9	22.9	22.3	22.6	22.1	24.2	25.9	25.4



The spectrograms of speech commands (go, stop, up, etc.)



System Overview:



Fabrication of D-MOSFET-based Retroreflector:



RF Signal Emission and Receiving

The dipole antenna, with a length of L , would resonate at the odd multiples of half-wavelength for the RF signal. Then, the candidate resonance frequency f_r can be expressed as follows:

$$f_r = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (2n - 1) \cdot c/L$$

We choose 2.25GHz, which resonates at 15 multiples of half-wavelength for a typical 1-m cable.

RF Signal Pre-processing

- Low-pass Filter
- Remove the DC component
- Divide the signal into segments with fixed length
- Calculate the mel-spectrogram of each segment

Rethink non-linear transfer curve before audio Reconstruction

$$y(t) = \begin{cases} \alpha \cdot V_{gs} + \beta & V_{gs} \geq 0 \\ -e^{\gamma \cdot V_{gs}} \cdot V_{gs} & V_c \leq V_{gs} < 0 \\ 0 & V_{gs} < V_c \end{cases}$$

**The negative part kept,
but distorted non-linearly.**

Rethink non-linear transfer curve before audio Reconstruction

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→ The negative part kept,
but distorted non-linearly.

1. Decompose the negative part:

$$a_1(t) = -e^{\gamma \cdot V_{gs}(t)}, \quad a_2(t) = V_{gs}(t), \quad y(t) = a_1(t) \cdot a_2(t)$$

Rethink non-linear transfer curve before audio Reconstruction

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2. Convolutional operation:



$$\begin{aligned} Y(f) &= \mathcal{F}\{a_1(t) \cdot a_2(t)\} \\ &= A_1(f) * A_2(f) = A_1(f) * \mathcal{F}\{V_{gs}(t)\} \end{aligned}$$

The original
Frequency spectrogram

How to compute? \leftarrow

$$\begin{aligned} A_1^{-1}(f) * Y(f) &= A_1^{-1}(f) * A_1(f) * \mathcal{F}\{V_{gs}(t)\} \\ &= \delta(f) * \mathcal{F}\{V_{gs}(t)\} = \mathcal{F}\{V_{gs}(t)\} \end{aligned}$$

Audio Reconstruction




Griffin-Lim algorithm



Experiment Setup

- Audio dataset
 - Free Spoken Digit Dataset (FSDD)
 - Speech Commands Dataset (SCD)
- Metrics:
 - Mel-cepstral distortion (MCD): A **lower** value indicates a **better** reconstruction performance.
 - Mean opinion score (MOS): A **higher** value indicates a **better** reconstruction performance.
 - Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR): A **higher** value indicates a **better** reconstruction performance.
 - Peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR): A **higher** value indicates a **better** reconstruction performance.
 - Accuracy and F1-score: A **higher** value indicates a **better** speech command classification performance.






Comparison between E and D MOSFETs:

COMPARISON OF MCD USING DIFFERENT MOSFETs

MOSFET type	E-MOSFET	D-MOSFET	
		Raw	Reconstructed
MCD	23.1	17.0	6.8

Speech reconstruction performance:



MCD for each speech command SNR/PSNR for each speech command MOS for each speech command

Speech command classification performance:

		Predicted									
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
True	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	0	28	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	3	0	3	0	26	0	1	0	0	0	0
	4	1	0	2	0	25	0	0	0	1	1
	5	0	0	0	0	0	28	0	0	2	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	29	0	0	0
	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	0
	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	0
	9	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	28

(a) 10 digit commands

		Predicted									
		go	st	up	do	le	ri	on	off	ye	no
True	go	28	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
	stop	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	up	0	1	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	down	0	1	0	29	0	0	0	1	0	0
	left	0	2	0	1	25	0	0	0	1	1
	right	0	0	0	0	0	27	0	0	0	2
	on	0	0	0	0	1	0	29	0	0	0
	off	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	26	0	0
	yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	0
	no	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31

(b) 10 action commands


F1-SCORE OF SPEECH COMMAND RECOGNITION

Command	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
F1-score	0.98	0.92	0.95	0.93	0.91	0.93	1.0	1.0	0.94	0.93
Command	go	stop	up	down	left	right	on	off	yes	no
F1-score	0.97	0.91	0.98	0.94	0.91	0.96	0.95	0.91	0.98	0.95


Confusion matrix of (a) digit (b) action commands

F1-score of digit and action commands


Impact of practical factors:




Distance












Volume



Wire type



Recognition accuracy of wire types

Speech Command	Original	Eavesdropped	Reconstructed
'Left'			
'Off'			
'Yes'			

- We propose the first wired audio eavesdropping attack, RF-Parrot, with a simple yet effective D-MOSFET retroreflector.
- RF-Parrot achieve 95% accuracy in identifying speech commands, by leveraging the encoder-decoder neural network with convolutional layers.
- We believe this work will raise awareness of the potential safety hazards of earphone systems.

Thanks for your listening!

Q&A

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